The Need to Modernize Our Immigration Laws by Gordon, Charles




During its first hundred years the United States imposed no re-
strictions on immigration. Some federal legislation sought to
encourage immigration1 and to improve conditions on ships bringing
immigrants. 2 The national policy during this period was to allow
the unrestricted entry of immigrants.3 Even so, the influx of immi-
grants was not universally favored. Some states sought to impose
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1. Act of July 4, 1864, ch. 246, 13 Stat. 385 (repealed by Act of March
30, 1868, ch. 38, § 4, 15 Stat. 58).
2. Act of March 3, 1855, ch. 213, 10 Stat. 715; Act of May 17, 1848, ch.
49, 9 Stat. 233; Act of Feb. 22, 1847, ch. 16, 9 Stat. 127; Act of March
2, 1819, ch. 46, 3 Stat. 488.
3. An unsuccessful early effort at restriction was the Alien Act of 1798,
ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570, a part of the Alien and Sedition Laws, which authorized
the President to expel from the United States any alien deemed dangerous.
This legislation was unpopular and expired at the end of its two-year term.
controls, but these efforts were struck down as an invasion of an
area of exclusive federal responsibility.
4
Continued demands for federal action eventually bore fruit in a
1975 statute barring convicts and prostitutes.5 Shortly thereafter,
the first general immigration law was adopted in 1882.0 This law
imposed a head tax and barred several categories of undesirable
aliens. During the subsequent years there were periodic major re-
codifications of the immigration laws, 7 eventually culminating in
the Immigration Act of 1917.8 A separate statute, enacted in 1924
and known as the National Origins Quota Law,0 for the first time
established numerical restrictions on immigration, superimposed on
the qualitative restrictions prescribed by the 1917 Act. All immi-
gration and nationality laws were consolidated in the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, also known as the McCarran-Walter
Act.10
A noteworthy feature of this development was the constant en-
largement of the scope and severity of the statutory provisions. In
addition, new statutory provisions often were built upon the old
structure. The result has been to produce a statutory pattern
which in many respects is cumbersome, obscure, and out of har-
mony with current conceptions. A novice who approaches this edi-
fice often is overwhelmed by its complexities. Even the expert
sometimes experiences difficulties and frustrations. It seems evi-
dent that a thorough overhaul of the immigration laws is desirable
in order to enhance clarity, assure substantive and procedural fair-
ness, and sanction increased administrative flexibility in dealing
with hardships and humanitarian concerns.
Each Congress witnesses some legislative efforts to deal with spe-
cific imperfections in the immigration laws. But, generally such
efforts attract little attention and almost invariably are abortive.
4. The "Passenger Cases:" Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875);
Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875); Smith v. Turner,
48 U.S. 283 (1849). Cf. City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102
(1837).
5. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477.
6. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214. Earlier the same year, Con-
gress had passed the Chinese Exclusion Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat.
58, establishing an exclusion policy which remained in effect until revoked
by the Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600.
7. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898; Act of March 3, 1903, ch.
1012, 32 Stat. 1213; Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084.
8. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874.
9. Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153. The Act of May 19, 1921,
ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5, had previously prescribed temporary numerical limitations.
10. Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 166.
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A significant exception occurred in 1965 when legislation was
adopted, after insistent advocacy by Presidents Kennedy and John-
son, ending the discriminatory national origins quota system.1
But this legislation merely modified a portion of the basic 1952 act,
leaving the remainder intact. There has been little effective legis-
lative activity since 1965.
Long exposure to the legislative process has convinced me that
immigration legislation does not occupy a very high priority among
Congressional concerns. Moreover, those who favor statutory revi-
sions often are reluctant to propose them, since past experience has
demonstrated to them that stirring the legislative pot may produce
a stew even less palatable than that now available. Nevertheless,
I believe it will serve a useful purpose to describe and discuss some
of the statutory changes I believe desirable. Others doubtless
would include additional items, but my enumeration may aid in
stimulating further discussion.
STATUTORY STRUCTURE
Any general revision of the immigration law should simplify its
structure, eliminating obscure and obsolete provisions which have
accumulated over the years. Many such obscurities represent con-
cepts which are no longer meaningful and which have persevered
because no one has taken the trouble to eliminate or modify them.
One example of such pointless complexity appears in the various
provisions for the exclusion, 12 deportation, 13 and denial of citi-
zenship benefits' 4 to subversives. The parallel directives of these
various statutes are couched in amazingly detailed verbiage which
is today largely meaningless. These statutes were developed and
enlarged during successive eras of anti-radical apprehension, such
11. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911. The committee
reports on this legislation are H.R. REP. No. 748, and H.R. REP. No. 1101,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
12. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 212(a) (27)- (29) [hereinafter
cited as I. & N. Act], 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a) (27) -(29) (1970). The power of
Congress in this area recently was reaffirmed in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753 (1972).
13. I. & N. Act §§ 241(a)-(c), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)-(c) (1970). Constitu-
tional challenges to deportation provisions directed against subversives
were rejected in Harisades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) and Galvon
v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
14. I. & N. Act § 313, 8 U.S.C. § 1424 (1970).
as that following the assassination of President McKinley,'5 the
Bolshevik scare of World War 1,16 the national security concern
preceding World War ]I,17 and the McCarthy witchhunt of the
1950's.1s They are an anachronism when the United States main-
tains friendly relations with Communist and other leftist-oriented
governments throughout the world. I certainly would not suggest
that the United States should not adopt adequate measures to safe-
guard its national security. But I believe this legitimate concern
should be expressed in statutory provisions which are simple, intel-
ligible, and rationally related to current needs.
Another area permeated by obsolete and inconsistent statutory
provisions relates to civil liabilities and administrative fines im-
posed against transportation lines for various infractions. Such ob-
ligations have been prescribed by the immigration laws since their
inception, and have been designed to promote cooperation by trans-
portation lines in assuring compliance with the law. The authority
to impose such penalties has repeatedly been upheld.1'
The present statute includes a variety of mandates which an-
nounce such civil obligations, including those relating to the failure
to furnish proper manifests, 20 the detention and deportation of ex-
cluded aliens,2 1 the failure to deport expelled aliens, 22 the failure
to detain and deport excluded alien crewmen, 2 the failure to pre-
vent the unauthorized landing of aliens,2 4 the landing of air-
craft,25 the bringing of diseased aliens2 and the unlawful bring-
ing of aliens,27 as well as additional provisions for criminal penal-
ties.28 But in many respects the statutory provisions dealing with
civil obligations are uncoordinated and inconsistent. For no ap-
parent reason, there are differing provisions regarding the company
officials, agents, or employees against whom the obligations can be
imposed, the amounts of the obligations, and the opportunities to
seek amelioration. And there are glaring inadequacies in relation
15. Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, §§ 2, 38, 32 Stat. 1213.
16. Anarchist Act of Oct. 16, 1918, ch. 186, 40 Stat. 1012.
17. Alien Registration Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, § 23, 54 Stat. 673.
18. Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 22, 64 Stat. 1006.
19. Elting v. North German Lloyd, 287 U.S. 324 (1932); Oceanic Steam
Nay. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909).
20. I. & N. Act § 231 (d), 8 U.S.C. § 1221(d) (1970).
21. Id. § 237(b), 8 U.S.C. 9 1227(b).
22. Id. § 243(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(e).
23. Id. § 254(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1284(a).
24. Id. § 271, 8 U.S.C. § 1321.
25. Id. § 239, 8 U.S.C. § 1229.
26. Id. § 272, 8 U.S.C. § 1322.
27. Id. § 273, 8 U.S.C. § 1323.
28. Id. §§ 274-78, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324-28.
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to the procedure for enforcing the penalty. The statute has little
to say about such procedure, and what it does say is not always
clear or consistent. It generally, but not invariably, states that de-
termination of liability is to be made by the Attorney General. In
one instance it declares that his determination shall be final,29 but
this declaration is omitted in other places. In most instances it au-
thorizes a denial of clearance as an auxiliary weapon of enforce-
ment. But other sections, for no apparent reason, make no mention
of denial of clearance.30 Obviously these statutory provisions need
revision to promote clarity and consistency, as well as an assurance
of fair consideration.
Tim GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION
The present statute sets forth 31 categories of aliens who are
barred from entry, and many of these categories can be divided
into numerous subcategories. 81 Some of these statutory provisions
are out of date and virtually meaningless; some are redundant;
many are excessive. A complete revision of these provisions cer-
tainly is desirable. However, I do not intend to discuss the specifics
of the numerous changes that seem warranted, except that I shall
direct attention to one such necessary change. I would emphasize
primarily two generalized revisions which, if adopted, would repre-
sent a giant step forward in modernizing this phase of the statute.
A Statute of Limitations for Excludability
While some of the grounds for exclusion, particularly those deal-
ing with medical infirmities, 2 relate only to those presently suffer-
ing from such disabilities, many other grounds for exclusion are
perpetual and forever bar the affected alien from the United States.
Thus, for example, aliens who have been convicted for certain crim-
inal offenses, 33 who have sought and obtained relief from military
service on the ground of alienage,84 who have been involved in
29. Id. § 239, 8 U.S.C. § 1229.
30. A catchall provision additionally authorizes recovery of such penal-
ties by civil suit, id. § 280, 8 U.S.C. § 1330.
31. Id. § 212 (a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a).
32. E.g., id. §§ 212(a) (1), (2), (4), (6)-(8), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a) (1), (2),
(4), (6)-(8).
33. Id. §§ 212(a) (9)-(10), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a) (9)-(10).
34. Id. §§ 101(a) (19), 212(a) (22), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 (a) (19), 1182(a) (22).
specified subversive activities, 5 who have had one or more attacks
of insanity,3 6 or who have been convicted for possession of mari-
huana,37 can never hope to enter the United States.3 8 These exclu-
sions extend into perpetuity and reject any opportunity for refor-
mation39 or for changed circumstances. 40 In practice, they often
result in extraordinary inequities and hardships. Thus an alien
who once sought relief from military service can never attain law-
ful permanent residence or citizenship in the United States, even
if he is married to an American citizen. An airline hostess who
unwittingly brought a package of narcotics is likewise barred as
a trafficker in narcotics, even if she cooperated in bringing the real
culprits to justice. Examples of such irrationality could be multi-
plied.
The perpetual bar to entry is irrational and unnecessary. What
is needed is a statutory amendment limiting excludability to a
designated period after the commission of the debarring offense. I
suggest that a five-year limitation would be fully adequate.
Discretionary Authority to Waive Grounds for Exclusion
In my estimation, the need to provide for amelioration of the ex-
cessive severities of our exclusion laws is manifest. That need will
continue even. if the substantive changes I have proposed are
adopted, since the mandatory exclusions will still cause family
separations and other hardships in particular situations.
The present law does sanction a wide range of discretion where
temporary entry is sought. Thus, the Attorney General, in con-
junction with the Secretary of State, may in his discretion waive
virtually any substantive4' or documentary 42 ground for exclu-
35. Id. § 212(a) (27)-(29), 8 U.S.C. H§ 1182(2) (27)-(29).
36. Id. § 212(a) (3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (3).
37. Id.
38. As noted under the next text caption, the Attorney General may
grant waiver of any ground for inadmissibility for temporary entrants,
except for aggravated subversive categories, and he may also authorize
temporary parole for emergent reasons in the public interest.
39. However, excludability for certain criminal offenses committed by
juveniles has a time limit of 5 years. I. & N. Act § 212(a) (9), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182 (a) (9) (1970). Excludability for membership or affiliation in certain
subversive organizations may be waived by the Attorney General for de-
fectors who have been "actively opposed" to the program of such organiza-
tions for at least 5 years. Id. § 212 (a) (28) (I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (28) (I).
40. However, limited provisions for discretionary waiver of some exclu-
sionary grounds are discussed under the next text caption.
41. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); I. & N. Act § 212(d) (3),
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d) (3) (1970). Such waivers may be granted by the attor-
ney general after they are recommended by the Secretary of State. The
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sion in regard to a temporary entrant. The Attorney General
is empowered in his discretion to grant temporary parole into the
United States for emergent or public interest reasons.
43
However, the opportunities to alleviate exclusion grounds for ali-
ens seeking permanent entry are much more circumscribed. The
1917 Act authorized discretionary waiver of exclusion grounds for
aliens returning after a temporary absence to an unrelinquished
domicile in the United States of seven consecutive years.44 The
administrative interpretations of this provision of the 1917 Act were
generous. 45 This generosity was criticized by Congress, 46 and the
1952 Act curtailed the ambit of the statute.47 The result is that
this remedy is now seldomly invoked.48 However, the law au-
thorizes the Attorney General in his discretion to waive the docu-
mentary requirements (immigrant visa and passport) for returning
resident immigrants.
49
The opportunities for waiver of the exclusions inhibiting the
establishment of residence in this country by other aliens are even
more sparse. As originally enacted, the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act of 1952 offered little comfort to such aliens. In the ensu-
ing years there have been sporadic legislative efforts to deal with
specific humanitarian situations. Thus, for aliens with close rela-
tives who are citizens or lawful permanent resident aliens, the law
now permits discretionary waivers of excludability for tuberculosis
or past mental illness,5" for criminal violations or prostitution,
51
and for fraud in seeking entry.52 But in almost every other re-
statute specifies that such discretion may not be exercised for aliens in the
aggravated subversive classes.
42. I. & N. Act § 212(d) (4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (d) (4) (1970). The requisite
documents for temporary entrants are nonimmigrant visas and passports
and they can be waived by the Attorney General and the Secretary of State
acting jointly.
43. Id. § 212(d) (5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d) (5).
44. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 878.
45. See In re B-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 204 (1942); In re L-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 1
(1940).
46. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 384 (1950).
47. I. & N. Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1970).
48. See In re S-, 6 L & N. Dec. 392 (1955); In re M-, 5 I. & N. Dec.
642 (1954); In re T-, 6 .& N. Dec. 136 (1954).
49. I. & N. Act § 211(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1181(b) (1970).
50. Id. § 212(g), as amended 8 U.S.C. § 1182(g).
51. Id. § 212(h), as amended 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).
52. Id. § 212(i), as amended 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i).
spect 5s the exclusionary provisions of the statute cannot be waived,
and perpetually bar entry into the United States, irrespective of
any hardships or humanitarian considerations that may be in-
volved.
I believe the inflexibility of the provisions of the immigration
laws in regard to the exclusion of aliens is undesirable and the op-
portunities for amelioration are fragmented and inadequate. I
would propose an amendment giving the Attorney General au-
thority to waive any ground for exclusion on humanitarian grounds
or for any other reason he deems in the public interest.
Exclusion of Marihuana Violations
Although there are numerous specific statutory provisions for ex-
clusion that need revision, I shall, as previously indicated, mention
only one such provision-the absolute bar to the entry of aliens
who have been convicted of possession of marihuana.5 4 In its ori-
ginal form, the 1952 Act merely barred violators of the laws relating
to narcotic drugs.55 A 1956 amendment barred those convicted
for possession of such drugs.56 The statute was again amended
to reach those convicted for such violations relating to mari-
huana.57 A consequence of this legislative development is that
an alien convicted for possession of a single marihuana cigarette is
forever precluded from entering the United States.
This is an irrational statutory provision, which definitely should
be eliminated. I shall deal with the background of this provision
more fully in proposing the elimination of a similar provision man-
dating the expulsion of aliens convicted in this country for posses-
sion of marihuana. 58
EXCLUSION PROCEDURE
Like other aspects of the immigration laws, the statutory provi-
sions dealing with entry procedures are in many respects archaic.
Adopted to implement past conceptions they have persevered
53. Mention should also be made of the authorization for discretionary
waiver of the two-year foreign residence requirement for exchange visitors
upon request of an interested government agency or a showing of excep-
tional hardship to close relatives. Id. § 212(e), as amended 8 U.S.C. §
1182(e)..
54. Id. § 212(a) (23), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (23).
55. Id.
56. Act of July 18, 1956, Pub. L. No. 728, 70 Stat. 575.
57. Act of July 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 505.
58. See notes 111-17 infra and accompanying text.
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although their underlying conceptions have been discarded or dis-
credited. I invite attention to the following needed revisions.
The Unreviewable Consular Decision Refusing a Visa
The 1952 Act specified that the Secretary of State is charged with
responsibility for administering the provisions of the Act relating
to the powers, duties, functions of diplomatic and consular offices,
except the powers of consular officers relating to the granting or
denying of visas.59 This remarkable provision purports to deny
to a Cabinet Officer the authority to control the activities of sub-
ordinate officials. While the purpose of this provision is not ex-
plained in the legislative reports, I believe its underlying motiva-
tions were a desire to preclude judicial review and a belief that the
consul would be disposed to act less generously than his superiors.
In my view both of these premises are unacceptable. In effect they
give to consular officers of the United States all over the world
unrestricted authority to determine whether they will issue a visa
to aliens who appear before them. I have no doubt that most con-
sular officers seek to act reasonably. But they can be wrong, and
in some instances a consular officer doubtless may act arbitrarily.
Since the visa is an indispensable document for those who wish
to enter the United States, 0 an erroneous or arbitrary refusal of
a visa can have a devastating effect on an applicant's aspirations.
The grant of unreviewable authority to the consul has been criti-
cized as inconsistent with American traditions of due process. 6'
Apparently in response to these criticisms, the State Department
has developed a process of informal review, which is now incorpo-
rated in its regulations.62 Under this system, the Visa Office of the
State Department will review the case if requested to do so by a
member of Congress, an attorney, or an interested party. If error
is found, the Visa Office will issue an "advisory opinion" to the
consul. While such an expression suggests rather than directs, and
59. I. & N. Act § 104(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1970).
60. Id. §§ 211(a), 212(a) (20), (26), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1181(a), 1182(a) (20),
(26).
61. See Wuom WE SHALL WELcom, REPORT OF PRES. CoMMuw. ON IMInGRA-
TION AND NATiONA=Ty 146-52 (1953); Rosenfield, Consular Non-Review-
ability, 41 A.B.A.J. 1109 (1955).
62. 22 C.F.R. § 42.130 (1975).
is not binding on the consul, a consul who receives such an "advi-
sory opinion" generally will abide by it.
But it is evident that this informal procedure does not, go far
enough. What is needed is an amendment of the statute elimi-
nating the directive making the consul's ruling unreviewable, and
establishing a right of appeal to a Board of Visa Appeals. If Con-
gress wishes to limit judicial review in such cases, it can do so by
appropriate statutory directives.
The Double Check on Entries
Another statutory anachronism is the provision that an entry ap-
plicant's qualifications must be passed on by two separate govern-
ment agencies. This duplication originally appeared in the Immi-
gration Act of 1924, which established for the first time a require-
ment that entry applicants must obtain visas.68 Since immigration
officers then operated only within the United States, it was natural
for Congress to confer the visa-issuing function on American con-
sular officers stationed in foreign countries.64 This pattern was
continued in the 1952 codification. 5 The consular officer has been
enjoined not to issue a visa to any alien he found to be inadmis-
sible.66 At the same time, the prospective entrant has been
warned that the issuance of a visa did not guarantee his admission
to the United States, since his admissibility would be determined
by an immigration officer at the port of arrival.
67
This repetitive procedure was endorsed by the authors of the 1952
Act as assuring a "double check" of the applicant's qualifications."
That conclusion reflected their characteristic suspicion that some
government officers might act generously and their efforts to in-
hibit such generosity.
Insofar as immigrant visas are concerned, this hypothetical
double check is meaningless, since immigration officers invariably
accredit the consular issuance of a visa. While immigration officers
sometimes question the bona fides of an alien seeking to enter as
a nonimmigrant, there is no reason why this cannot be done by
one officer when the nonimmigrant visa is issued. And the idea
63. Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, § 13(a), 43 Stat. 161.
64. Id. § 2.
65. I. & N. Act § 221, 8 U.S.C. § 1201 (1970).
66. Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, § 2(f), 43 Stat. 153 [now I. & N. Act
§ 221(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (1970)].
67. Id. § 2(g) [now I. & N. Act § 221(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1201(h) (1970)J.
68. See S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1365,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
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that immigration officers cannot operate overseas has been refuted
by the experience of many years. Immigration officers of the
United States are today stationed in many countries. Indeed,
there are immigration district directors in Frankfurt, Germany;
Hong Kong, B.C.C.; Mexico City, Mexico; and Rome, Italy, as well
as other immigration officers in Athens, Greece; Guadalajara,
Mexico; Hamilton, Bermuda; Manila, P.I.; Monterrey, Mexico; Mon-
treal, Canada; Naples, Italy; Nassau, Bahamas; Ottawa, Canada;
Palermo, Italy; Tijuana, Mexico; Tokyo, Japan; Toronto, Canada;
Vancouver, Canada; Victoria, Canada; Vienna, Austria, and Winni-
peg, Canada.69 There is no practical reason why there should be
more than a single determination of admissibility and this should
be done by immigration officers stationed in the foreign countries,
subject to a check of identity upon arrival. The Department of
State should be relieved of the visa-issuing burden, except for visas
to diplomatic and international organization officials. In isolated
areas where it is not feasible to station or send immigration officers,
the consuls could exercise delegated authority to determine the ap-
plicant's admissibility. Similar delegations are now made with re-
spect to some immigration functions.70
The Labor Certification Requirement
The immigration laws of the United States traditionally have
been concerned with the protection of American labor. This con-
cern was originally expressed in the Contract Labor Act of 1885,71
which prohibited the entry of aliens for whom work contracts had
been arranged in advance. Changing world and domestic condi-
tions eventually made the contract labor laws obsolete. The growth
of the labor unions and the imposition of numerical restrictions on
immigration provided assurance against an influx of cheap foreign
labor. And it eventually was concluded by Congress that the public
interest would best be served if immigrants were free to arrange
in advance for employment in this country. Therefore, the Con-
tract Labor Act was repealed by the 1952 Act.
72
69. 8 C.F.R. § 100.4 (1975).
70. See 2 C. GoRDoi & H. ROSENFELD, IIGRATION LAW AN'm PROcEDURE
§ 6.14d (rev. ed. 1975).
71. Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332.
72. See note 68 supra.
However, Congress believed that some standby protection of
American labor should be included in the statute.7 Therefore the
1952 Act introduced the so-called labor certification requirement,
which authorized the Secratary of Labor to preclude the entry of
specific immigrants or classes of immigrants if he found that they
were coming for employment which would deprive American work-
ers of jobs or undercut their wages or working conditions.74
In its original form this sanction rarely was invoked. However,
the restrictive pattern was altered by the major amendments of
1965, which directed that specified classes of immigrants could not
come to the United States unless they first obtained the requisite
labor certification. 75 This converted the labor certification from
a passive requirement, to be fulfilled only if the Secretary of Labor
demanded it, to an active requirement, which had to be observed
by all immigrants, except those with designated close relatives in
the United States.
It is my conviction, which is shared by government officials,
legislators and legislative staff attorneys, and other knowledgeable
observers, that the labor certification requirement in its present
form is a failure. In the first place, its impact on the employment
situation in the United States, even in this era of high unemploy-
ment, is negligible. A substantial segment of prospective immi-
grants are close relatives of American citizens and resident aliens,
and are thus exempt from the labor certification requirement. An-
other segment are wives and children who will not enter the labor
market. The remainder, aggregating less than 100,000 annually, is
hardly significant when compared to a work force of 80 million.
In the second place, the procedure to enforce this requirement
has been an administrative nightmare. The decisional criteria are
obscure and often unrevealed and the administrative officials fre-
quently have been criticized for processes and determinations that
are arbitrary and lacking in due process.7 6
Despite the general agreement regarding the labor certification
procedure's inadequacies, there has been no serious effort to revise
it. The reason seems to be the opposition of organized labor to
removal of a protective device. I believe there is no sound reason
for the retention of this unsatisfactory and obstructive mandate in
73. Id.
74. L & N. Act § 212 (a) (14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (14) (1970).
75. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 10, 79 Stat. 917.
76. See recommendation 73-2 in 3 ADmSTRATIVE CONFERENCE O TIM
UNItED STATES (1973).
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its present version. I would favor an amendment of the statute
restoring the labor certification requirement to its original form,
to be invoked only upon an affirmative finding of need by the Secre-
tary of Labor. In my view such a standby measure would afford
adequate protection to American labor.
Exclusion Without a Hearing
One of the regrettable survivals of a past era is the authority
to exclude aliens without a hearing on the basis of confidential in-
formation. Originally developed in the absence of statute during
World War 1I, its use blossomed during the Cold War period follow-
ing that conflict, and its constitutionality was upheld by a bare ma-
jority of the Supreme Court.77 The Supreme Court later ruled
that this extraordinary procedure could not be used to captiously
deny a hearing to a resident of this country returning from a brief
absence abroad.78 But Congress expressly ratified the exclusion-
without-hearing procedure in the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, and
it is still part of the parent statute.79
The device of exclusion without a hearing, and its reliance on
faceless informers, has been severely criticized as inconsistent with
American traditions of fair play.8 0 As a former government offi-
cial who observed this system in operation and officially defended
it, I believe such criticism is fully justified. During the Cold War
period this device was used extensively to bar supposed Communist
Party members, often on flimsy and unverified information, with-
out affording them any opportunity to defend themselves. While
its use has diminished in recent years,81 the authority still remains
on the books and it is still invoked in some cases. Administrative
officers sometimes have denied hearings on evidence which is inade-
quate or which is unavailable for production at a hearing. Unfor-
77. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Knauf v. Shaughnessy,
338 U.S. 537 (1950).
78. Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953). See also Roggenbihl v. Lusby,
116 F. Supp. 315 (D. Mass. 1953); cf. Chew v. Rogers, 257 F.2d 607 (D.C.
Cir. 1958).
79. I. & N. Act § 235(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (1970); 8 C.F.R. § 235.8
(1975).
80. Rosenfield, Necessary Administrative Reforms in Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, 27 FoRDEAm L. REv. 145 (1958).
81. Gordon, Due Process in Immigration Proceedings, 50 A.B.A.J. 34, 38
(1964).
tunately this is the course of least resistance, since denial of entry
on secret information avoids the possibility of public criticism if
entry were granted to a person who later proved to be objection-
able.
It is clear to me that the present statutory provision authorizing
exclusion without hearing is wrong and should be modified or re-
pealed. I do not believe the Republic would collapse if the authori-
zation for denial of a hearing to entry applicants were removed
from the statute. However, I would not object to a more limited
amendment, which would place stringent limitations on the invoca-
tion of this exceptional procedure. In the first place, I would spe-
cify that this power could be exercised only during time of war
or declared national emergency. Such a limitation appears in other
sections of the statute,82 but was omitted here. Secondly, I would
narrowly restrict the authority to invoke this power to situations
clearly and directly involving the national security. The present
statute is impermissibly broad, e.g., in authorizing its use in cases
which merely involve suspected membership in the Communist
Party or other subversive groups.
Place of Deportation for Excluded Aliens
The statute directs that an alien arriving in the United States
whose exclusion is ordered shall be immediately deported to the
country whence he came. 8 "Country whence he came" in this con-
text is a term of art, and normally contemplates that the excluded
alien will be restored so far as possible to his situation before ar-
rival in this country. Usually this means the country in which he
had a place of abode before coming to this country.8 4
In this statutory provision we confront another survival from a
different age, during which immigrants were coming by ship, and
an exclusion order meant that they were to be put back on that
ship or another ship and returned to their homes. Today most im-
migrants come by plane, and there is no urgent need to return
an excluded alien to his original place of abode, if there are more
acceptable alternatives. Indeed, the assumption that an excluded
82. E.g., I. & N. Act § 215, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1970).
83. Id. § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a).
84. See United States ex rel. Milanovic v. Murff, 253 F.2d 941 (2d Cir.
1958) (alien could not be sent to native country he had left as a refugee
13 years earlier); Wah v. Shaughnessy, 190 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1951); Stacher
v. Rosenberg, 216 F. Supp. 511 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (long time resident of U.S.
was excluded after temporary absence even though the U.S. was the country
from whence he came).
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alien will be immediately sent home often is unfounded, in the light
of the time-consuming administrative and judicial remedies avail-
able to him.85 In this respect superior procedures are prescribed
for the execution of an order for the expulsion of an alien in the
United States.86 An expelled alien may select the country of his
destination, if that country will accept him, and if such a selection
is not made or is fruitless, the Attorney General may deport the
alien to other countries that will accept him, such as the country
of his nationality or a number of other designated countries.8
7
It seems to me that similar flexibility in exclusion cases would
be beneficial to the alien and the government. I can see no reason
why the excluded alien should not be permitted to go to the country
of his nationality or any other country that will accept him. And
I can see no reason why the government should be restricted to
one place where the excluded alien can be sent, if he is a national
of another country or if any other appropriate designation can be
found. Consequently I would favor an amendment of the statute
giving an excluded alien the opportunity to select his own destina-
tion, and giving the Attorney General the authority, similar to that
conferred by the expulsion statute, to select other appropriate
destinations if the excluded alien makes no selection or is not ac-
ceptable to the country he selects.
QUOTA PROVISIONS
The Western Hemisphere Quota
There were no numerical restrictions on immigration from the
Western Hemisphere until 1968. In a gesture of amity, the National
Origins Act of 1924 exempted natives of Western Hemisphere coun-
tries from quota restrictions, 88 and this exemption was continued
by the Act of 1952. 89
85. See, e.g., Rogers v. Quan, 357 U.S. 193 (1958); Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S.
185 (1958).
86. Provisions of prior law, no longer in effect, which likewise provided
for deportation of an expelled alien to the "country whence they came"
were construed to relate to the country of the alien's citizenship, if he had
not acquired a domicile or citizenship elsewhere. United States ex Tel.
Mensevich v. Tod, 264 U.S. 134 (1924); United States ex Tel. Boraca v.
Schlotfeldt, 109 F.2d 106 (7th Cir. 1940); United States ex rel. Di Paola v.
Reimer, 102 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1939).
87. I. & N. Act § 243(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1970).
88. Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, § 4 (c), 43 Stat. 155.
89. I. & N. Act § 101 (a) (27), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1970).
In its original version, the bill proposing the major statutory
amendments which eventually were enacted in 1965 did not include
any change in the exempt status of Western Hemisphere aliens.
However, this issue was debated during consideration of the mea-
sure. A proposal for restriction of Western Hemisphere immigra-
tion was rejected by the House of Representatives,e but was fa-
vored by the Senate.91 In the end, those who favored restriction
prevailed. 2 As enacted, the 1965 Act established a separate quota
of 120,000 annually for the Western Hemisphere, to become effective
July 1, 1968, unless Congress directed otherwise.98 The 1965 Act
established a Select Commission on Western Hemisphere Immigra-
tion,94 which recommended deferment of the special quota,95 but
this recommendation was not adopted by Congress, and the special
Western Hemisphere quota became effective July 1, 1968. Since the
provision for a Western Hemisphere quota was a last minute com-
promise in the legislative deliberations preceding adoption of the
1965 Act, it was not incorporated into the basic statute. The result
is that there are two separate and uncoordinated statutes regulating
immigration-one for the Western Hemisphere and the other for
the rest of the World (designated as the Eastern Hemisphere).
Moreover, the Western Hemisphere quota provisions are not well-
detailed, and contain none of the preferences prescribed in the basic
statute, except the exemption for immediate relatives of American
citizens. This places immigrants from the Western Hemisphere at
a distinct disadvantage, since there are no preferences within the
120,000 quota for those with various close family ties or with needed
skills.
There is no doubt that this discrimination against Western Hemi-
sphere aliens is an historical accident, attributable to the last-
minute compromise placing the provisions for the Western Hemi-
sphere quota in the 1965 Act. The Administration has opposed this
irrational discrimination, and legislation to end it has been intro-
duced by Representative Rodino for several years but has not yet
been enacted.96
It is clear that any provisions dealing with the Western Hemi-
sphere quota should be incorporated into the basic statute. I would
90. See H.R. REP. No. 745, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1965).
91. See S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
92. See H.R. REP. No. 1101, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1965).
93. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, § 21(e), 79 Stat. 921.
94. Id. § 21 (a).
95. SELECT COmmISSION ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE IVIGRATION, FINAL RE-
PORT 9-12 (1968).
96. See H.R. 981, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975).
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favor a single worldwide quota for all immigrants, other than the
exempt classes. In my view, the retention of the separate quotas
for the Eastern and Western Hemispheres is unnecessary and un-
desirable. What is more important is that the preferences now
fixed by the statute be made applicable to Western Hemisphere im-
migrants. It is equally important, in my view, that the liberalizing
amendments should not actually be restrictive. The basic statute
has an annual limitation of 20,000 quota immigrants from any sin-
gle country.9 7 If applied to the Western Hemisphere countries,
this limitation would actually reduce immigration from Mexico
to a fraction of its present level of over 50,000 annually.98
It seems to me that the close proximity of Mexico and Canada
warrants exceptional treatment. The Administration has urged
that the situation of Canada and Mexico, as friendly neighbors,
warrants allowing those countries a special annual limitation of
35,000 immigrants each. While this proposal was rejected by a ma-
jority of the House Judiciary Committee,99 it was supported in a
minority report by Chairman Rodino.100 In my view this is a
situation in which form must yield to substance. Moreover, a re-
duction in the opportunities for legal immigration from Mexico
would inevitably lead to increased pressure for illegal entries. In
order to recognize the special situation of Canada and Mexico, and
to avoid an actual restrictive impact of a liberalizing measure, I
believe a special provision, along the lines urged by Chairman Ro-
dino, should be made to allow immigration allotments for Canada
and Mexico which would not substantially reduce their present
level of legal immigration.
Preferences
The present law establishes seven preferences for the allocation
of visas within the world wide quota.101 Four of these, the first,
second, fourth, and fifth preferences, seek to promote family
unity, and are allotted to specified close relatives of American citi-
97. I. & N. Act § 202, 8 U.S.C. § 1152 (1970).
98. See 1974 INS AxN. REP.
99. See H.R. REP. No. 461, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
100. Id. at 49.
101. I. & N. Act § 203, 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970).
zens or resident aliens. Two, the third and sixth preferences, de-
pend on occupational skills or status, and seek to fulfill national
needs. The seventh preference relates to refugees. I believe a
number of changes in the preference system are warranted.
The first needed change, already discussed under the preceding
caption, would extend to Western Hemisphere aliens the same
preference system now available in the Eastern Hemisphere.
Second, the present statute grants the second preference to the
spouses and unmarried sons and daughters of lawful resident aliens,
but does not mention the parents of such aliens.10 2 I believe the
principle of family unity fostered elsewhere in the statute would
best be served by the extension of this preference to include the
parents of such aliens.
Third, the present statute grants exempt immediate relative
status to the parents of American citizens, but only if the citizen
is at least 21 years of age. 0 3 The evident purpose of this restric-
tion, whose constitutionality has been upheld by the courts,
104 is
to deny benefits to aliens to whom a child is born while they are
illegally or temporarily in the United States. Yet the child in such
cases undoubtedly is an American citizen entitled to reside in the
United States. And in other contexts Congress has granted special
benefits, without age limitations, to parents of citizen children. 08
I believe it reasonable under such circumstances to give some pre-
ferred status to the parents of a minor citizen so as to facilitate
the child's remaining in the country where he is a citizen.
GRou.Ns FOR DEPORTATION
Absence of Statute of Limitations
Early deportation statutes fixed periods of limitations for deport-
ability originally 1 year after entry and then increased to 3 years
and eventually to 5 years. 0 6 However, the 1952 Act eliminated
102. Id. § 203 (a) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (a) (2).
103. Id. §§ 201(a), (b), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(a), (b).
104. Faustino v. INS, 432 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
921 (1971); Perdido v. INS, 420 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1969).
105. E.g., I. & N. Act § 212(a) (14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (14) (1970)
(waiver of labor certification for Western Hemisphere immigrants); id. §
212(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(g) (waiver of excludability for tuberculosis or
mental defects); id. § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (waiver of excludability
for crime and prostitution); id. § 212 (i), 8 U.S.C. 1182 (i) (waiver of exclud-
ability for misrepresentation); id. § 241 (f), 8 U.S.C. 1251 (f) (waiver of de-
portability for misrepresentation).
106. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874; Act of March 3, 1903,
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all statutes of limitations, and there is now no statute restricting
the time during which deportation proceedings may be commenced.
And since the statutory provisions for deportation generally are
retroactive, they may reach back into the past, subjecting an alien
to deportation for conduct which was not then proscribed-even
where the period of limitations had long since expired under pre-
vious law.
107
The absence of a statute of limitations in the deportation law has
been severely criticized.1 03 The ancient traditions of our law re-
quire provision for repose, after the lapse of specified periods of
time, for all civil and criminal infractions, except murder and trea-
son. The removal of time restrictions for deportation in the 1952
Act bespeaks a callous attitude toward aliens as human beings. Ap-
parently the sponsors of that legislation were willing to disregard
the need for repose in human affairs, and the compelling humani-
tarian concerns developed by aliens during long residence in this
country, including family ties, economic interests, and deep roots
in the community. Moreover, the present statute countenances the
shocking consequence of requiring the deportation of an alien who
was brought as a child, has been reared in our society, and would
be sent to a country in which he would be a stranger.10 9
It is true that the immigration laws now provide a number of
avenues for relief in such situations." 0  Some of these discre-
tionary remedies, and proposals to expand their scope, will be dis-
cussed hereafter. But all of these remedies depend on the exercise
of discretion by the Attorney General. What is needed is a statute
ch. 1012, § 21, 32 Stat. 1213; Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 11, 26 Stat.
1084; Act of Oct. 19, 1888, ch. 1210, 25 Stat. 565.
107. Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692 (1957); Lehmann v. United
States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685 (1957); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302
(1955).
108. WHOM WE STHAT.lL WELco~m, supra note 61; Maslow, Recasting Our
Deportation Laws, 56 CoLum. L. REv. 309, 325 (1956).
109. E.g., Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955); Harisiades v. Shaugh-
nessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952). Challenges to deportation as cruel and unusual
punishment in such situations have been unsuccessful. Cf. Marcello v. Ken-
nedy, 194 F. Supp. 748 (D.D.C. 1961), a-f'd on other grounds, 312 F.2d 874
(D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 933 (1963). See also Wolf v. Boyd,
287 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1961).
110. E.g., I. & N. Act § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1970) (suspensiin of deporta-
tion); id. § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (adjustment of status); id. § 249, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1259 (registry).
granting amnesty from deportation after the lapse of a fixed period
of time.
I believe therefore that the deportation law should be amended
to provide periods of limitations in the following respects: First,
a person who was brought to this country as a child, and has lived
here for at least 10 years, is a product of our society and should
not be subject to deportation on any ground. In every other case,
an alien should not be subject to deportation if 5 years have elapsed
since his last involvement in conduct which would have rendered
him subject to deportation.
Marihuana Violators
Since 1922111 there have been laws providing for the deportation
of narcotics offenders. The Act of 1952 codified and expanded those
laws.11 2
In their original form these statutes were found inapplicable to
convictions for the possession of marihuana.11 8 However, in 1960
Congress amended the statute to make it specifically applicable to
marihuana violations. 14  Under the present statutory provisions,
an alien who is convicted of possessing even a single marihuana
cigarette is subject to perpetual exclusion from the United States,
and to deportation if he is already a resident of this country."65
In recent years there has been extensive discussion of the exces-
sive severity of federal and state provisions for criminal punish-
ment of persons found guilty of possessing marihuana. Substantial
amelioration of the federal criminal provisions was accomplished
in 1970.116 More recently, the National Commission on Mari-
huana and Drug Abuse recommended repeal of all criminal provi-
sions for possession of marihuana. Other proposals have urged that
the offense be made a civil violation, subject to a small penalty,
rather than a criminal offense. Some government officials have
stated that they would welcome a change in the marihuana laws,
and ameliorating changes have already been adopted by many
111. Act of May 26, 1922, ch. 402, 42 Stat. 596.
112. I. & N. Act § 241(a) (11), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (11) (1970).
113. Hoy v. Rojas-Gutierrez, 267 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1959); Hoy v. Men-
doza-Rivera, 267 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1959).
114. Act of July 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-648, § 9, 74 Stat. 504.
115. I. & N. Act § 212(a) (23), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (23) (1970) (exclusion);
id. § 241(a) (11), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (11) (deportation).
116. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236.
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states. And many prosecutors have declined to prosecute for simple
possession of marijuana.
Unfortunately, this enlightened attitude in regard to the posses-
sion of marihuana has not yet been reflected in the immigration
statutes. The inflexible provisions of those statutes still require
the exclusion and deportation of any aliens convicted for possession
of marihuana. Consequently the immigration authorities have been
confronted with many cases in which the statute commands the
banishment from the United States of youthful aliens who have
been convicted for possessing a few marihuana cigarettes. The en-
forcement of the statutory mandate often would result in perman-
ent separation of families. It is patent that this is an unconscion-
able and unreasonable penalty.
Recognizing the disparity between the nature of the offense and
the grave impact of its consequence, the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service has frequently exercised its prosecutive discretion
to withhold deportation proceedings or the execution of deportation
orders in such cases, particularly when potential separation of fami-
lies is involved. But this dispensation depends on administrative
discretion and the affected alien remains under a perpetual threat
of banishment or exclusion from the United States.
It seems manifest that the retention of these irrationally severe
provisions in the immigration laws cannot be justified in the light
of the apparent national consensus favoring easing or elimination
of the sanctions for simple possession of marihuana. Legislation
to modify these provisions has been introduced in Congress.
117
Although the objectives of these bills were endorsed by the Depart-
ment of Justice, they have not yet been acted on by Congress. I
urge that Congress take action promptly to eliminate the present
provisions requiring exclusion from the United States and deporta-
tion of aliens convicted for possession of marihuana.
Clemency Provisions for Criminal Violators
Since 1917 the immigration laws have provided for deportation
of certain aliens convicted in the United States for commission of
117. H.R. 681, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 2166, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973); S. 277, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
crimes involving moral turpitude.118 The same laws have also
included concomitant provisions expunging deportability when the
relevant convictions have been ameliorated by a pardon or a judi-
cial recommendation against deportation.119
In the 58 years since enactment of the 1917 Act, various other
types of criminal convictions in the United States have been added
to the catalogue of deportable offenses. Thus, under the present
statute an alien resident of the United States may incur deport-
ability upon conviction of specified improprieties in relation to alien
registration or visa documents,120  narcotics,' smuggling of
aliens,'122 unlawful possession of weapons,123 certain subversive
activities, 12 4 and importation of aliens for prostitution or any
other immoral purpose. 25 However, the statute makes no provi-
sion for avoidance of deportability in such cases by a pardon or
judicial recommendation against deportation.
Since there is no sound basis for differentiation, the failure to
make uniform provisions for amelioration appears to be an over-
sight. Indeed, the present statutory formula sanctions amelioration
of deportability for aliens convicted of the more serious offenses
involving moral turpitude but not for those convicted of lesser of-
fenses. I believe this is an irrational situation, and I urge that it
be corrected by an appropriate amendment of the statute pro-
viding that a pardon or judicial recommendation against depor-
tation will expunge deportability based on any criminal offense.
A major 1956 enactment imposing severe penalties against nar-
cotics violators included a provision prohibiting relief from depor-
tation, through a pardon or judicial recommendation against depor-
tation, for aliens convicted of offenses related to narcotics or mari-
huana.126 Under prior law, a pardon or recommendation against
deportation precluded deportation for such convictions.12 7  While
118. I. & N. Act § 241(a) (4), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (4) (1970); Act of Feb.
5, 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874.
119. L & N. Act § 241(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1970); Act of Feb. 5, 1917,
ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874.
120. I. & N. Act § 241(a) (5), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (5) (1970).
121. Id. § 241(a) (11), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (11).
122. Id. § 241(a) (13), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (13).
123. Id. § 241(a) (14), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (14).
124. Id. §§ 241(a) (15), (16), (17), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251 (a) (15), (16), (17).
125. Id. § 241(a) (18), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (18).
126. Act of July 18, 1956, ch. 629, §§ 301(b), (c), amending I. & N. Act
§§ 241(a) (11), (b), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a) (11), (b) (1970).
127. United States ex rel. De Luca v. O'Rourke, 213 F.2d 759 (8th Cir.
1954); DangNam v. Bryan, 74 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1934).
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severe penalties against narcotics traffickers are appropriate, it
seems to me that the inflexible preclusion of clemency is unjusti-
fied. In practice, this preclusion has been excessively harsh when
the offense was minimal, the offender youthful, and when deporta-
tion would disrupt family ties. I can perceive no sound justification
for precluding the humanitarian exercise of clemency in such situa-
tions, and I urge that the statutory preclusion be eliminated.
The statutory provision referred to in the first paragraph of this
subsection above, giving effect to a judicial recommendation against
deportation for aliens convicted of crimes involving moral turpi-
tude, stipulates that such judicial recommendations will be given
effect only if made by the sentencing court "at the time of first im-
posing sentence or within 30 days thereafter."'128 The purpose of the
provision manifestly is to preclude last-minute efforts to forestall
deportation. This legislative objective is fulfilled when the sen-
tencing court is aware of the defendant's amenability to deporta-
tion and of its power to make a recommendation which would avoid
this additional penalty, resulting from the conviction and sentence.
Such awareness generally is present when the sentence is imposed
in a federal court. However, the overwhelming preponderance of
criminal prosecutions take place in the state courts and such courts
frequently are unaware that the convicted defendant is amenable
to deportation and that they are empowered to avert this conse-
quence by a timely recommendation against deportation.
Some courts which have inadvertently omitted to make a recom-
mendation against deportation at the time of "first" imposing sen-
tence have later sought to remedy this omission, but such recom-
mendations after the prescribed statutory period have been ineffec-
tual.129 Likewise disregarded have been nunc pro tunc efforts
to correct the original judgment.
130
The undoubted objective of the statute is to give the sentencing
court an opportunity to ameliorate a severe collateral consequence
of the conviction, when it deems such a consequence excessive in
128. I. &N. Act § 241(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1970).
129. United States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1926);
Bruno v. United States, 336 F. Supp. 204 (W.D. Mo. 1971).
130. Velez-Lozano v. INS, 463 F.2d 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Matin v. INS,
438 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Piperkoff v. Esperdy,
267 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1959).
the light of the particular circumstances. 3 1 The objective is, in
effect, defeated when the sentencing court is unaware of its au-
thority to make such a recommendation. Therefore I believe the
statute should be amended by eliminating the restriction on the
time when the sentencing court can make its recommendation
against deportation.
DIscREIoNARY AuTHORIT TO WAIVE GROUNDS
FOR DEPORTATION
During much of their history, the immigration laws were cast
in inflexible terms, and afforded little room for the exercise of dis-
cretion. Mounting hardships eventually persuaded Congress to al-
low the amelioration of such hardships. A major breakthrough
occurred in the Alien Registration Act of 1940,182 which author-
ized the Attorney General to suspend deportation of certain deport-
able aliens whose deportation would result in hardship to their fam-
ilies. However, their deportability could not be obliterated until
the Attorney General's action was ratified by Congress. In approv-
ing this measure, President Roosevelt expressed doubt as to the
constitutionality of the provision for congressional veto of adminis-
trative action, and similar doubts have since been expressed in
scholarly discussions. 13 3 Yet, provision for congressional veto of
the Attorney General's grant of suspension of deportation has re-
mained in the statutes since 1940.134
In the years after 1940 other discretionary remedies have been
provided to permit discretionary waiver of deportability in some
situations. The principal remedy today is known as adjustment of
status, and enables the Attorney General, in his discretion, to grant
permanent residence status to certain aliens in the United States
whose original temporary entry was lawful and who are otherwise
admissible to the United States.135 Another statutory remedy is
known as registry, which authorizes the grant of permanent resi-
dence to certain aliens who have resided in the United States since
1948.136 There is no requirement of congressional approval of
131. See Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120 (1964); Gubbels v. Hoy, 261 F.2d
952 (9th Cir. 1958).
132. Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, title II, 54 Stat. 670.
133. See Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 30 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 467 (1962); Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration
by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HAnv. L. REv. 569 (1953).
134. See I. & N. Act § 244(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (1970).
135. Id. § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255.
136. Id. § 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259.
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such discretionary actions of the Attorney General. However, few
grounds of deportation can be waived in such proceedings.
Some improvement could be made in the present statutory pro-
visions, such as eliminating the need for congressional approval of
suspension of deportation, and by advancing the cutoff date to
qualify for registry to 1968 or some later date. 37 However, these
changes would not offer a complete remedy for the present inade-
quacies. I believe the inflexibility of the deportation provisions of
the immigration law is undesirable and that the opportunities for
amelioration are fragmented and inadequate. Indeed, affected per-
sons often have sought intervention by Congress through private
relief legislation, an unsatisfactory and usually unattainable de-
vice to engage the attention of Congress on individual cases. I
recommend, therefore, a complete revision of the provisions of the
immigration laws relating to the Attorney General's authority to
waive excludability or deportability. The Attorney General should
be given discretionary authority to waive any grounds for exclusion
or deportation, without the need for soliciting congressional ap-
proval.
In this connection, another needed change in the provisions re-
lating to adjustment of status should be mentioned. A 1965 amend-
ment, adopted to meet supposed enforcement problems, denies this
remedy to natives of Western Hemisphere countries. 13 The effect
of this provision is to deny to all natives of Western Hemisphere
countries the opportunity, available to immigrants from all other
parts of the world, to attain permanent residence in the United
States, even if they are otherwise fully qualified for such status.
Legislation to end this discrimination is pending in Congress, 13 9
and I believe such legislation merits unqualified support.
EXPULSION PROCEDURE
The deportation process was one of the earliest and most potent
expressions of administrative justice. Although the procedure in
137. A similar proposal appears as H.R. 8713, § 4, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975). See also H.R. REP. No. 94-506, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 et seq. (1975).
138. See H.R. REP. No. 745, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1965); S. REP. No.
748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1965).
139. H.R. 8713, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See also H.R. REP. No. 94-
506, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1975).
deportation cases originally was quite informal, over the years there
has been a steady improvement. 140 In major part, this improve-
ment resulted from corrective action by the courts; in part it was
the product of internal administrative development, influenced no
doubt by the attitude of the courts, the Bar, the media, and the
public. Although some might not share this view, it is my belief
that in general, deportation procedures have been developing satis-
factorily. I would, however, favor the following changes.
Applicability of Administrative Procedure Act
There is a constitutional right to a fair hearing in deportation
cases.141 However, over the years this right has not always meant
the same thing. Due process of law is a developing concept, and
this development has been quite notable in deportation proceedings.
For many years, the deportation hearing was conducted by a sin-
gle immigration officer, known as the presiding inspector, who
acted both as prosecutor and judge. This arrangement was
criticized, but it continued without change until the enactment of
the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.142 This statute dealt
generally with all government agencies, and sought to improve the
quality of administrative adjudications and to achieve a separation
between adjudicating and prosecuting functions. In 1950 the Su-
preme Court held the Act applicable to deportation hearings. 143
But Congress quickly repudiated this decision by specifically ex-
empting deportation hearings from the procedural requirements of
the Act. 44 This exemption was thereafter upheld by the Su-
preme Court. 45
In the ensuing years there has been constant improvement in de-
portation procedures. While the exemption from the Act's pro-
cedural requirements remains on the books, 4 the procedures
now in effect are closely analogous to those required by the
Act.147 The principal difference is that the officers who preside
at the hearings are called special inquiry officers (now designated
immigration judges) and are selected through normal civil service
procedures rather than under the Act.
140. See Gordon, supra note 81.
141. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (The Japanese Innigrant
Case).
142. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237; see Gordon, supra note 81.
143. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
144. Act of Sept. 27, 1950, ch. 1052, 64 Stat. 1044.
145. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
146. I. & N. Act § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970).
147. See Gordon, supra note 81; Maslow, supra note 108, at 309.
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The exemption of deportation hearings from the Act's require-
ments is an anachronism, which has no rational meaning and serves
no useful purpose. Removal of this exemption would enhance the
status of the deportation hearing officers and would provide firmer
assurance of fairness in the deportation process. It seems to me
that the retention of this exemption is attributable only to inertia,
and I urge that it be removed and that the procedural requirements
of the Act be made fully applicable to deportation proceedings.
Statutory Recognition of the Board of Immigration Appeals
The Board of Immigration Appeals is an important administra-
tive tribunal, which hears appeals in deportation cases and other
matters. However, the Board has never been a statutory body, and
it exists only by virtue of the Attorney General's regulations.148
The Attorney General has created the Board and has fixed its
powers. Thus he can and does modify its powers, and he could,
if he wished, abolish the Board. It is true that in practice the At-
torney General has never attempted to interfere with the Board's
decision-making process,149 except to the extent that he retains
authority to review its decisions.150  Moreover, immigration
practitioners are generally quite satisfied with the Board's perfor-
mance, although they of course reserve the lawyer's right to disagree
with individual decisions. Yet the lack of statutory sanction does
detract from the Board's stature and may lead to public uncertainty
regarding its independence.
I believe there is no reason to continue the Board's tenuous status,
and I favor the enactment of legislation making it a statutory body.
NATIONALITY PROVISIONS
The nationality provisions of the statute frequently are confusing
and uncoordinated. A complete overhaul of this aspect of the stat-
ute is doubtless justified. However, I will deal briefly with only
a few proposed changes.
148. 8 C.F.R. pt. 3 (1975).
149. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280 (1955);
United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
150. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d) (2) (1975).
A Statute of Limitations for DenaturalizationJ
Since 1906 there has been statutory authorization for judicial pro-
ceedings to revoke naturalizations which were obtained by fraud
or illegality.151 The constitutionality of this remedy has been
repeatedly upheld by the Supreme Court.
5 2
Recognizing the severity of this sanction and its possible impact
on apparently established citizenship rights, the Supreme Court has
formulated the rule that naturalizations cannot be revoked unless
the government establishes their impropriety by evidence which is
clear, unequivocal and convincing, and does not leave the issue
in doubt. 53 And the policy of the Department of Justice has been
to refrain from bringing denaturalization suits unless the citizenry
of the United States would thereby be bettered. 154 The combina-
tion of these judicial and administrative policies has led to a reluc-
tance on the part of the Department of Justice to bring denaturali-
zation suits, and few such proceedings have been instituted in re-
cent years.
Yet the authority to revoke naturalizations remains in the stat-
ute. Moreover, the statutes have never prescribed a time limitation
for bringing a denaturalization suit. Therefore a naturalization
theoretically is subject to revocation, upon a charge that it was im-
properly obtained, at any time after it has been granted. Indeed,
there have been numerous instances where the courts have vacated
naturalizations granted many years earlier. 55
The absence of a statute of limitations on denaturalization suits
has been criticized as placing the naturalized citizen's status in per-
petual jeopardy.156 However, the courts have rejected conten-
tions that such protracted delay denies due process of law"7 or
constitutes laches. 158
As I have indicated in the previous discussion dealing with de-
151. I. & N. Act § 340, 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (1970); Nationality Act of 1940,
ch. 876, § 338, 54 Stat. 1137; Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3592, § 15, 34 Stat.
596.
152. Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946); Luria v. United States,
231 U.S. 9 (1913); Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912).
153. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944); Schneiderman
v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
154. Dept. of Justice Circular Letter No. 107 (1909), noted in 3 C. GoR-
flON & H. ROSENFEI=, ImnMGRATi oN LAw Am PaocEunn § 20.3 (rev. ed.
1975).
155. E.g., Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961) (27 years).
156. WHOM WE STnAL WELCOmE, supra note 61; A.B.A. Res. VI-12 (1968).
157. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961).
158. Id.; United States v. Oddo, 314 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1963).
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poration, the absence of a statute of limitations is repugnant to
American jurisprudence. Moreover, the situation in which a na-
uralized American citizen is forever fearful of the Sword of
Damocles hanging over his head is abhorrent to our traditional con-
cepts of freedom. And it can cogently be contended that this per-
petual liability makes the naturalized American a second class citi-
zen.
American citizenship is an invaluable right, and the public inter-
est requires that the citizen enjoy a reasonable security in his
status. Consequently it seems to me that a statute of limitations
on the bringing of denaturalization suits is needed, and I would
favor a statutory amendment outlawing such suits after the lapse
of a reasonable period following the naturalization. Because of
the difficulty often encountered in discovering evidence of impro-
priety, a ten-year period of limitations in such cases would not be
unreasonable.
Repeal of Unconstitutional Expatriation Statutes
Until 1907 there were no statutes prescribing grounds for ex-
patriation, and the manner in which a person could lose his Ameri-
can citizenship was uncertain.159 In 1907 Congress passed the
first statutory declaration that expatriation would occur if the citi-
zen was naturalized in or took an oath of allegiance to a foreign
state.160 The Nationality Act of 1940 considerably enlarged the
grounds for expatriation.161 And the statutory grounds for ex-
patriation were again expanded in the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952.162
159. See TIsiAx(G, THE QuEsTIoN OF EXPATRIATION IN Am1ERICA PRIOR TO
1907 (1942); cf. Act of July 28, 1868, R.S. 1999 (recognizing a right of ex-
patriation without defining the manner in which this could take place).
160. Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 2, 34 Stat. 1228. The 1907 Act also
provided that an American woman would lose her citizenship if she married
a foreigner. Id. § 3. See Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915) (rejecting
a constitutional challenge). This portion of the 1907 Act was repealed by
the Act of Sept. 22, 1922, ch. 411, § 7, 42 Stat 1021. Another provision of
the 1907 Act, held to relate only to loss of diplomatic protection, declared
that if a naturalized citizen resided in a foreign state for certain periods,
it was presumed that he had lost his American citizenship. Act of March
2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 2, 34 Stat. 1228. See United States v. Gay, 264 U.S. 353
(1924).
161. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, §§ 401-09, 54 Stat. 1137.
162. I. & N. Act §§ 349-57, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481-89 (1970).
The expatriation grounds set forth in the 1940 and 1952 Acts en-
compassed many situations in which American citizenship could be
lost without the citizen's assent. The constitutionality of such
deprivations was soon challenged in the courts, and the courts were
receptive. In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court declared un-
constitutional various statutes which prescribed expatriation for de-
sertion from the U.S. armed forces during time of war,10 3 evasion
of military service by absence from the United States, 0 4 residence
abroad by a naturalized citizen,165 and voting in a foreign political
election.166 Yet Congress has not amended the statute to elimi-
nate these unconstitutional provisions and other statutory provi-
sions dependent on them.
I believe the retention of these unconstitutional provisions as part
of the existing statute may be misleading to the public and to mem-
bers of the bar who are unfamiliar with the development of these
adjudications. Therefore it is desirable that the statutory provi-
sions relating to expatriation be recast along the lines projected by
the Supreme Court decisions. The revised statute manifestly
should repeal the statutory provisions which have been invalidated
as unconstitutional.
Elimination of Witnesses in Naturalization Proceedings
The statutes dealing with naturalization, since their inception,
have required that the petition for naturalization be verified by
two witnesses. The present statute also requires that the witnesses
be credible citizens of the United States, that they must have per-
sonally known petitioner, and that they endorse the petitioner's
character and attachment to the United States.167
While witnesses to the naturalization petition may have played
a significant role prior to 1906, when there was no administrative
supervision of the naturalization process, they serve no useful pur-
pose today. The petitioner selects his own witnesses, and their tes-
timony has little significance in evaluating the petitioner's fitness.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service is now given extensive
powers to investigate naturalization petitions, and its inquiry in-
variably includes fingerprint checks and thorough interrogation by
a naturalization examiner. 68  In addition, the Service may con-
163. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
164. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
165. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
166. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
167. I. & N. Act §§ 334(a), 335(f), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1445(a), 1446(f) (1970).
168. Id. § 335, 8 U.S.C. § 1446 (instructions on form N-400).
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duct a personal investigation of the naturalization petitioner in
the localities of his residence and employment.169 The qualifica-
tions of the petitioner are assessed on the basis of such official in-
quiries rather than the endorsements of the petitioner's witnesses.
The requirement for two verifying witnesses to the naturalization
proceeding is thus archaic and meaningless. In practice, it produces
unnecessary hardships since the witnesses have to take time off
from their employment, often imposing a financial burden on them
and on the naturalization petitioner, who sometimes must reim-
burse them for their lost wages. In addition, a petitioner who has
lived in several places has the difficult task of locating verifying
witnesses who will furnish depositions for each such place.
170
It seems clear that we here confront another statutory require-
ment which has outlived its usefulness and is retained only
through sheer inertia.'17  Elimination of the requirement of two
verifying witnesses to the naturalization petition is long overdue.
Reacquisition of American Citizenship by Expatriates
To a limited extent our laws have recognized the need to facili-
tate the return to the United States and reacquisition of American
citzienship by those who have lost or relinquished it.' T2 How-
ever, in other respects such expatriates are given no special con-
sideration, and are treated like all other aliens. 73
The failure to make such special provision often has resulted in
separation of families and other hardships, particularly in regard
to many young Americans whose opposition to our involvement in
Vietnam led them to relinquish American citizenship. 174 While
opinions may differ on the soundness of their actions, it seems to
me that a welcome to our prodigal sons is a reasonable and humani-
169. Id.
170. Id. § 335(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1446(f).
171. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 738, 745 (1950).
172. See I. & N. Act §§ 101(a) (27) (c), 324(a), 327, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 (a)
(27) (c), 1435(a), 1438 (1970).
173. See United States ex rel. Marks v. Esperdy, 315 F.2d 673 (2d Cir.
1963), affd by equally divided court, 377 U.S. 1010 (1964); I. & N. Act §
202(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1152(b) (1970).
174. See, e.g., Jolley v. INS, 441 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 946 (1971).
tarian approach to this problem. Therefore, I would favor an ex-
tension of present statutory provisions, giving special benefits to
expatriates, in order to facilitate return to the United States and
reacquisition of American citizenship by those who have previously
lost or relinquished it.
Simplification of Conditions for Acquiring Citizenship Derivatively
One of the most confusing and unsatisfactory areas of the law
concerns the citizenship status of the foreign-born children of
American citizens. Under some conditions the children born abroad
to American citizens acquire American citizenship at birth,17
subject, in some instances, to fulfillment of prescribed conditions
subsequent in order to retain their American citizenship. 170 In
other situations, alien children can acquire American citizenship
through the naturalization of their parents.177
In my estimation, the conditions prescribed in the present law
are unnecessarily complex. Moreover, in some situations they are
irrational, such as those precluding transmission of citizenship to
a foreign born child by a native-born American parent under the
age of 19 (age 21 under prior law) who has lived in the United
States all or most of his life.'7 8
But the greatest difficulties have been presented by the constant
changes in the conditions applicable to the acquisition of citizenship
in such cases. Different conditions have been prescribed by laws
effective prior to May 24, 1934;1" 9 between May 24, 1934 and Janu-
ary 12, 1941;1"0 between January 13, 1941 and December 23,
1952;181 and on or after December 23, 1952.182 Since the acquisi-
tion of derivative citizenship status is dependent on the law in ef-
fect at the time the decisive occurrences took place, it is necessary
to identify dates and consult disparate laws before determining
whether there is a valid claim to American citizenship. The result
is a confusing jumble which confounds even the experts. At times,
the responsible government agencies have prepared complicated
charts for the guidance of their officers, but such efforts have not
175. I. & N. Act §§ 301, 309, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1409 (1970).
176. See Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
177. 1. & N. Act §§ 320, 321, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1431, 1432 (1970).
178. Ruiz v. INS, 410 F.2d 382 (6th Cir. 1969); In Te S- F-, 2 I. & N.
Dec. 182, 195 (1944) (approved by the At'y Gen.).
179. Rev. Stat. § 1993, 18 Stat. 350 (1802); id. § 2172, 18 Stat. 380 (1802).
180. Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 1, 48 Stat. 797.
181. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, §§ 201, 313, 314, 54 Stat. 1137.
182. See notes 175 & 176 supra.
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been entirely satisfactory. Further, they have not been made gen-
erally available to the Bar and the public.
The prevailing fog of uncertainty in this area is a source of con-
stant frustration, both to the expert and the novice; a situation
hardly consistent with the importance and the dignity of American
citizenship. I see no reason why this fog cannot be dispelled by
a statute defining, in simple and clearcut terms, the conditions un-
der which derivative citizenship can be acquired in such cases.
Moreover, it is important that such conditions be made equally ap-
plicable to all past occurrences, without disturbing any citizenship
rights already vested. Such legislation would clarify statutory pro-
visions which are unnecessarily complex, and would promote
greater certainty in adjudicating citizenship rights.
CONCLUSION
In the foregoing discussion I have outlined a number of neces-
sary amendments to the immigration and nationality laws of the
United States. I do not suggest that this is a complete list, since
I, myself, could suggest additional changes, and I am certain that
others would offer other proposals. For example, I have not dis-
cussed the Rodino Bill to penalize the knowing employment of
aliens illegally in the United States, pending in the current Con-
gress and strongly supported by the Administration, since I am not
fully convinced that this is necessary or desirable legislation. I
have attempted, however, to describe a number of deficiencies
which urgently need correction. It is my hope that this discussion
will be useful at some future date, when an enlightened public
awareness will provide the needed stimulus for action.
